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Abstract
Contact networks can significantly change the course of epidemics, affecting the rate of new infections and the mean
size of an outbreak. Despite this dependence, some characteristics of epidemics are not contingent on the contact
network and are probably predictable based only on the pathogen. Here we consider SIR-like pathogens and give an
elementary proof that for any network increasing the probability of transmission increases the mean outbreak size. We
also introduce a simple model, termed 2FleeSIR, in which susceptibles protect themselves by avoiding contacts with
infectees. The 2FleeSIR model is non-monotonic: for some networks, increasing transmissibility actually decreases the
final extent. The dynamics of 2FleeSIR are fundamentally different from SIR because 2FleeSIR exhibits no outbreak
transition in densely-connected networks. We show that in non-monotonic epidemics, public health officials might be
able to intervene in a fundamentally new way to change the network so as to control the effect of unexpectedly-high
virulence. However, interventions that decrease transmissibility might actually cause more people to become infected.
Keywords: network, epidemiology, cascades, SIR model, Rayleigh monotonicity
1 Introduction
Epidemic, infection, contagion and cascade are interchangeable terms referring to a probabilistic process over
a population connected through a contact network. Such a process can model infectious diseases, but is also
relevant in studying phenomena such as transmission of information and propagation of changes through a
system [1–4].
In studying epidemics, one of the central problems is how the structure of the network affects propagation.
For example, the epidemic might affect more people if infected individuals are connected to many susceptible
individuals, rather than to other infectees [5]. Another important problem is characterizing the final extent
of the epidemic as a function of the pathogen, such as its likelihood to transmit across contacts.
Intuition suggests that more transmissible epidemics and more dense contact networks would lead to
larger outbreaks on average. We propose to call such epidemics monotonic. In contrast, non-monotonic
epidemics are those that do not follow this rule. With a non-monotonic epidemic, the extent might increase
with transmissibility if the contact network has a particular structure but in other networks the extent might
decrease. We call the two possibilities concordant and discordant networks. Non-monotonic epidemics, if
they exist, would be significant public-health challenge: In them measures that retard transmission at the
individual level (i.e. in a network of two connected individuals), might create a concordant network and
actually promote the epidemic in the population at large.
This paper contributes an elementary rigorous proof showing that a certain commonly-used epidemic
model is monotonic (sec.2). More importantly it introduces a simple network-based model for behavior
during an outbreak (sec.3). The latter model is shown as non-monotonic - a finding with both positive and
negative implications to public health.
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2 Monotonicity of the SIR model
Many epidemics, perhaps the majority, are described using the “SIR” model and its generalizations. SIR
models are useful in applications where the epidemic infects each network node at most once, for example be-
cause it is lethal, or produces lasting immunity. Originally the SIR model was formulated as a system of three
differential equations, representing the number of “susceptible” (S), “infected” (I) and “removed”/”recovered”
(R) individuals [6]. An early network model of such epidemics was the percolation model [7] where indi-
viduals are sites of a D-dimensional discrete lattice. A site in this lattice has probability p of infecting a
neighbor, independently for each neighbor [8]. Many generalizations of this model have been developed, for
example, allowing for variability in the contact rate between pairs, temporal changes in the network and
others [2, 3, 9–11].
To make the discussion precise, let us consider a simple discrete-time SIR model on networks. In this
model, σ, τ , and γ are probability distributions for the induction, transmission, and removal steps.
Definition 1. The epidemic is a discrete-time process on a directed graph G(V,A). At each time t =
0, 1, 2 . . . the set of nodes V is partitioned into three disjoint sets: V = St ∪ It ∪Rt. At time t = 0, R0 = ∅
and each node u is added to the set of initial infectees, I0, with probability σ(u) (the “induction probability”).
For each t = 0, 1, 2 . . . the following sequence of three events occurs for each node u in state I (u ∈ It): (1)
it is removed with probability γ(u); (2) If u was not removed, then for each of its out-neighbors in state S,
that is node v ∈ St where (u, v) ∈ A, there is independent probability τ(u, v) of turning v to state I (giving
v ∈ It+1); (3) If u is not removed yet, then it is “cured” by time t+1 (u ∈ Rt+1). Once in state R, the node
remains there for all future times. A node in state S remains in that state unless infected.
The current definition is in some ways both more general and more narrow than those considered in other
works. It is more general in that, for example, the set of initial infectees is not necessarily a single node or
even have a particular size (although this is included as a special case by making σ(v) ∈ {0, 1} for all v ∈ V ).
It is more narrow in that for instance, the time is discrete and the duration of every infection is exactly 1. A
consequence of the discretization, which will be used shortly, is that the epidemic reaches a stationary state
by time t ≤ n, where n = |V |. This is because any node infected at time t1 becomes R at time t1 + 1. Thus
at least one new infection must be established at each t or else the epidemic dies out.
How do the parameters of this epidemic affect its size? Intuition suggests that increasing transmissibility
τ would tend to increase the extent of the epidemic. Heuristically when τ is larger there more paths for
the epidemic to reach any susceptible node. This argument is supported by analytic approximations, results
from special graphs and computer simulations on various variants of SIR [2, 9, 12]. However, increasing
transmissibility sometimes introduces “spread-blockers” into the network: nodes that become infected early
in the course of the epidemic but do not spread it further, and then prevent the epidemic from spreading
through them into other parts of the network. In certain network topologies, such an effect might conceivably
outweigh the increase in transmission probability.
We now show how the mean final extent of the epidemic, E (|Rn|), is affected by the parameters of the
epidemic. Namely, the mean size of the epidemic on all contact network topologies will not decrease because
of (1) expansion in the set of initial infectees, (2) an increase in the probability of transmission, or (3)
decrease in the probability of removal:
Theorem 1. Let τ , τ+ be two probability measures for transmission events, with τ+(e) ≥ τ(e) for all e ∈ A.
Let γ−, γ be two probability measures for removal events, with γ−(v) ≤ γ(v) for all v ∈ V . Let σ, σ+ ⊂ V be
the induction probabilities into the initial infectee sets of the two epidemics, with σ+(v) ≥ σ(v) for all v ∈ V .
Consider two epidemics on G, epidemic E described by σ+, γ−, τ+ and epidemic E described by σ, γ, τ . The
mean final extent E (|Rn|) is not smaller in E:
Eσ+,γ−,τ+ (|Rn|) ≥ Eσ,γ,τ (|Rn|) .
The proofs in the appendix will show precisely when the equality occurs. A corollary of the monotonicity
in τ is that adding edges (contacts) to the network also never decreases the mean extent, because a missing
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edge e is equivalent to τ(e) = 0. Similarly, adding susceptible nodes cannot decrease mean extent because
of γ monotonicity. Vaccinating nodes (in effect, increasing the probability of removal) would also tend to
decrease the final extent, never increasing it.
This theorem is an epidemiological equivalent of a much-studied property of electrical networks, known
as Rayleigh monotonicity [13–15]. Rayleigh monotonicity describes the effect of individual resistors in a
network on the “effective resistance” of the entire network. The effective resistance across any two terminals
(nodes) imagines that the network is just a single resistor and asks how large that resistor would have to
be. Rayleigh monotonicity is the finding that regardless of the network, increasing any single resistor in
the network will not decrease the effective resistance across any pair of terminals. Interestingly, one of the
many proofs of Rayleigh monotonicity is based on relating it to a stochastic process on the network [13].
Monotonicity results are also known for other stochastic contexts [16, 17].
Because SIR is such an important model, many previous studies considered the extent of SIR epidemics
[18–21]. However, on networks most exact statements require G to have a special structure (e.g. a tree [9]).
In spectral graph theory some related results [22] show the connection between the transmission probability
τ (β in their notation) and cascade extent. Most similar to this study is the superb work of Floyd, Kay and
Shapiro [23], who established the monotonicity of two SIR-type models using measure-theoretic arguments.
We offer an alternative proof here using elementary graph-theoretic methods and then introduce a novel
non-monotonic model. In outline, the proof uses graph cuts where a cut is formed from nodes that prevent
the infection of a node u.
3 Non-monotonic Models and Self-Protective Behavior
Can we expect monotonicity to hold in other epidemiological models? Likely, variants of SIR as well as
models with an exposed compartment (SEIR) should also exhibit monotonicity. This is because increasing
parameters such as transmission likelihood τ increases the effective number of links in the network.
In light of this intuition, it is perhaps surprising that some models are non-monotonic. Namely, there
are epidemics where increasing the transmissibility actually decreases the extent. The contact network may
play a decisive role: while in some network topologies, parameters such as transmissibility are positively
related to the final extent, in other networks the relation is negative. We will see that a simple source of
non-monotonicity is the behavior of susceptible individuals who may attempt to reduce their risk of infection
- a process which was termed reactive social distancing [24]. Depending on the pathogen they may obtain
vaccinations, wear protective equipment, or maintain distance from fulminating individuals.
Such protective behaviors during epidemics have attracted a lot of recent research [4], with models that
describe the effect of infections on demand for vaccines, self-imposed isolation and other behaviors (see
e.g. [10, 25, 26].) It is typical that individuals engage in protection only when they see the pathogen in a
family member or a friend, and usually dismiss news reports or advocacy by the authorities as exaggerated or
too inconveniencing given the risk [27]. One expects this lazy reaction particularly when the risk of infection
is low or when the symptoms are rarely life-threatening, such as during seasonal respiratory infections.
Surprisingly, even during the severe 1918 Influenza pandemic people apparently delayed distancing until
they witnessed fatalities [24]. A lazy response is consistent with previous research that established that
many costly behaviors are triggered only after a social threshold is crossed, such as when more than one peer
is already involved [28, 29].
Consider a simple model for this behavior that could be termed “2FleeSIR”. This model combines the SIR
model with a simplified model for distancing. In 2FleeSIR the epidemic follows steps (1), (2) and (3) in Def. 1
of SIR. 2FleeSIR simply adds step (0) where any susceptible node u that observes ≥ 2 infected individuals in
its immediate in-neighborhood will break all its ties and remain so for the duration of the epidemic. Thus in ef-
fect, every edge e coming into u will have transmission τ(e) = 0. 2FleeSIR is inspired by a model introduced in
[26] but supposes susceptibles base their behavior only on their immediate neighbors in the network. 2FleeSIR
is a threshold cascade as in [29], but unlike with other published models, here the contagion is harmful.
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Fig. 1: The “Diamond” graph illustrates the
complex behavior of the 2FleeSIR
model. For an epidemic that starts
at a, increasing the transmission
probability τ initially increases the
epidemic’s extent. Then as τ → 1
the extent diminishes because indi-
viduals take protective measures.
Thus when the threshold is crossed the propagation is sup-
pressed rather than promoted.
Consider now the spread of a 2FleeSIR epidemic on a small
diamond-shaped network in Fig. 1. For simplicity, suppose that
the epidemic originates at node a, the removal probability is
0, and all edges transmit with probability τ . As τ increases
it becomes increasingly likely that the epidemic infects both
b and c, which causes d,e and f to take protective measures.
As a result, its extent declines (see Fig. 2, left.) It is difficult
to determine if such a decline is seen frequently in empirical
contact networks because of insufficient data. In simulations
on other network we observed that it is more typical to see
a reduction in the rate of increase in extent as a function of
transmissibility (see one simulation in Fig. 2, right).
There is typically much uncertainty as to parameters such
as the basic reproductive ratio, R0, of an epidemic [31]. For-
tunately, if distancing is likely to happen, such a high R0 is
unlikely to produce dramatically many new cases and may even reduce the total case load. A striking effect
of distancing is seen in the case of a fully-connected network. Recall that in fully-connected populations, the
SIR model shows a jump in mean extent once τ passes the percolation transition τ = 1
n
[9]. This outbreak
transition is a key concern in attempting to control infections [6, 31]. However, no such jump occurs in
2FleeSIR. Rather when the epidemic starts at a single infected node, the ultimate extent is 1+ τ(n−1), that
is, linear in τ and the number of nodes n. This finding suggests that models like SIR might fundamentally
misestimate the progression of epidemics if those cause wide-spread distancing behavior. Sadly, in many
epidemics the threshold for protective action might be difficult to cross or susceptibles might be unable to
reliably identify infectives in their social neighborhoods.
The 2FleeSIR model also cautions about an interesting adverse effect of treatments. Consider again the
Diamond network, and suppose a vaccine or therapy completely prevents the infection of treated nodes and
suppose node c is treated. Under low τ it would reduce the final extent, but under τ → 1, it would be
impossible for node d, e and f to respond and they would all become infected. As a result, the treatment
would actually increase the number of infectees from 3 before treatment to 6 after! It is difficult to determine
how frequently this is occurring in practice.
Earlier, Floyd et al. [23], pointed out that vaccination might interact with a non-monotonic epidemic
in another way to cause an increase of the epidemic’s extent. Suppose the population is exposed to the
epidemic in two phases such that in the second phase the pathogen has mutated into a more transmissible
form. Without vaccination there might be an early outbreak that creates recovered individuals who act as
cascade blockers. With vaccination those blockers do not emerge and the more virulent second strain is able
to infect a larger number of individuals.
4 Discussion
Like this study, many recent projects in mathematical epidemiology developed network-based models of
contagions, often finding corrections to earlier models based on ordinary differential equations (ODEs). But
Theorem 1 here and Ref. [23] show that in a fundamental sense the ODE version of SIR gives a correct
description of the contagion: it is monotonic [6]. In this narrow sense the network does not matter. We do
not know how general this is, and an important avenue research is studying monotonicity in other epidemic
models from the SIR family, such as those with continuous time. Analogous results likely also hold in SIS,
SEIR and other classes of models.
One may wonder whether monotonicity of final size might be true on average: For example, given two
epidemics, if E has a higher transmissibility on average (computed over edges), would it also have a larger
mean extent? The answer is negative because of the preponderance of network topology. If the edges of
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Fig. 2: The mean extent of SIR and 2FleeSIR epidemics on two contact networks: on the Diamond network
(left) and on an empirical social network, the Karate Club (right) [30]. In both cases distancing in
2FleeSIR leads to a smaller mean extent as compared to SIR. In the Diamond network the extent
actually decreases for sufficiently large τ . The experiments were slightly different: in the Diamond
network the epidemic was started only at node a, while in the Karate Club it was started uniformly
at all nodes. In the Diamond network, the decrease is only seen in epidemics that start at a.
lower transmission are bridge edges between parts of the contact network, the effect of lower transmission
would be magnified arbitrarily.
The 2FleeSIR model, introduced here, exemplifies the other possibility, rarely considered: a non-monotonic
epidemic where a more virulent epidemic is less likely to spread in certain discordant networks. This finding
has public health implications. Discordant networks act like an automatic stabilizer, reducing the mean
outbreak size if the virulence increases. But, even if the pre-outbreak network is concordant, public health
officials might be able to intervene and make the network discordant and thus passively control the outbreak.
Non-monotonicity also suggests that it is possible in theory for therapies such as vaccines to increase the
extent of epidemics by interfering with socially-driven preventative behavior of individuals. At this point
there is no hard data for speculation on whether such an effect occurs frequently in practice. Indeed the
lesson from recent outbreaks of Measles is just how dangerous insufficient vaccine coverage can be to public
health.
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A Elementary Proof of Monotonicity of SIR
This applies graph-theoretical techniques to prove the monotonicity of SIR. The proof builds on a Lemma:
decreasing the removal rate increases the probability of infecting every node in the network.
Lemma 1. Suppose two epidemics both originate at some source node s, {s} = I0 (i.e. σ+(v) = 1 = σ(v)
iff v = s otherwise = 0), and both have τ(e) = 1 for all e ∈ A. Let the probabilities of removal be γ−(v) and
γ(v) such γ−(v) ≤ γ(v) for all v ∈ V . Then for any node u, the probability of infection is not smaller under
5
γ−:
Pγ
−
(u ∈ Rn) ≥ Pγ (u ∈ Rn) .
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1: Special case
Here we will prove the Lemma in the case where there is just one node such that γ−(z) < γ(z), while
γ−(v) = γ(v) for all z ∈ V r z.
Recall the distinction between removal events as opposed to “cure” events: the former occur before
infection of out-neighbors while the latter after. Note now that it is possible to decide in advance of the
epidemic whether the event of removing v occurs, conditional on v becoming infected (an example of the
principle of deferred decision). In this perspective, even if the epidemic has not yet happened, we can speak
of the probability that node v is removed.
The infection of u at some time k + 1 < n can occur if and only if (1) there is at least one directed path
from node s to u: (s, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (vk, u) satisfying (2) s ∈ I0, v1 ∈ I1, . . . , vk ∈ Ik, and (3) where no vi is
removed. Because τ(e) = 1 for all e ∈ A, if (3) is satisfied for path p so does (2) for all nodes in p. Observe
that any non-self-intersecting directed path (i.e. any path in a graph-theoretic sense) from s to u meets the
topological condition (1), and any infection path must be a path s→ u (since no node can be infected more
than once).
Let PT be the set of all paths s→ u. Assume for now that PT 6= ∅, i.e. condition (1) is satisfied for at
least one path. If for all p ∈ PT at least one node v ∈ p is removed (i.e. there is an s − u node cut in the
graph) then u cannot become infected. Conversely, if u is not infected then all of the paths have at least one
removed node. Let C be the set of all possible s− u cuts in (V,A). Recall that an s− u cut C is defined as
a set of nodes so that any path s→ u must pass a node v ∈ C. Let Cz be the set of all “z-vital” cuts: Cz is
defined as all cuts C ∈ C such that (1) z ∈ C and, (2) if z is excised from C, then C is no longer an s− u
cut (illustrated in Fig. 3).
s
z
a b u
Fig. 3: An illustration of z-vital cuts. For an epidemic that originates in node s, cut {a, z} is s − u z-vital
but cuts {b} and {b, z} are not.
The event where u is not infected could then be due to two types of cuts: (a) Fz =the removed nodes
form a cut ∈ Cz or (b) Fz¯ =the removed nodes form a cut ∈ C r Cz. These two events are disjoint. We
obtain:
P(u ∈ Rn) = 1− P(a cut exists in the paths s→ u)
= 1− [P(Fz) + P(Fz¯)] .
Observe now that Pγ(Fz) = Pγ(Fz |z is removed)Pγ(z is removed)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ(z)
. The left term in this product does
not depend on γ(z) because it expresses the probability of a type of s − u cut in some graph G′ - a graph
that in effect does not even have node z. Observe also that the probability of the other event, Pτ (Fz¯) does
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not depend on γ(z) because any cut ∈ Fz¯ will be a cut with or without the failure of z. Replacing terms
that do not depend on γ with constants c1 and c2 get:
Pγ
−
(u ∈ Rn) = 1−
[
Pγ
−
(Fz) + Pγ
−
(Fz¯)
]
= 1− c1γ−(z)− c2
≥ 1− c1γ(z)− c2 = Pγ (u ∈ Rn) .
This completes Step 1. Observe that if γ−(z) < γ(z) (strictly), then the probabilities of infection are
equal in the two epidemics if and only if c1 = 0, that is if Pγ
−
(Fz) = 0. This is the situation where no z-vital
s − u cut is possible or has positive probability. This means that either no directed path s → u exists (for
example, z might be a node of out-degree 0) or that for every z-vital cut C the probability is 0 that every
node t 6= z is removed.
Step 2: The general case
Consider a sequence of epidemics E = E1, E2, . . . , En = E where epidemic i differs from epidemic i + 1
at most at a single node vi. Namely, in epidemic i, γi(ui) = γ−(ui) while in epidemic i + 1, γi+1(ui) =
γ(ui) ≥ γ−(ui). Applying the result in Step 1 to each pair of epidemics produces a sequence of inequalities
Pγ1 (u ∈ Rn) ≥ Pγ2 (u ∈ Rn) ≥ · · · ≥ Pγn (u ∈ Rn).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that E is described by σ+, γ−, τ+ and E is described by σ, γ, τ . The following argument proves the
result by constructing increasingly general situations.
Step 1: Simplest case
Consider first the case where only the removal probabilities are different, namely: (1) E and E both originate
in node s, and (2) in both τ(e) = 1 for all edges e. By linearity of expectation and Lemma 1:
Eγ
−
(|Rn|) =
∑
u∈V
Eγ
−
(1u∈Rn) =
∑
u∈V
Pγ
−
(u ∈ Rn)
≥
∑
u∈V
Pγ (u ∈ Rn) = Eγ (|Rn|) .
Step 2: Reduction of transmission events to removal events
Any pair E and E which have possibly transmission probabilities different from 1 can be mapped to a pair of
the same extents but where the transmission probability is 1, as follows. Take epidemic Eγ,τ that starts at
node s and has transmission probabilities τ and removal probabilities γ, and construct an epidemic Eγˆ where
τ(e) = 1 for all edges e. This can be done by constructing graph (V ′′, A′′) in which every edge e = (v, w) ∈ A
is replaced by a two-hop path (v, h), (h,w) such that τ(v, h) = 1 = τ(h, v) and the new helper node h has
removal probability γˆ(h) = 1−τ(e). The removal probability is unchanged for all regular nodes: γˆ(v) = γ(v)
for all v ∈ V .
Couple the epidemics (any event X in Eγ,τ occurs if and only if the corresponding event occurs in Eγˆ)
and compare:
1. If in epidemic Eγ,τ node v is infected then the infection is transmitted to w with probability τ(v, w). If
in epidemic Eγˆ node v is infected then the infection is transmitted to w with the exact same probability:
1 · [1− (1− τ(v, w))] · 1 = τ(v, w) .
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2. In epidemic Eγ,τ node v is infected at time t (transmission through t edges) if and only if in epidemic
Eγˆ node v is infected at time 2t (because it takes two time steps to transit every path between nodes
copied from the original graph. Consequently, in Eγˆ the epidemic will end by time 2n.
3. If v ∈ V is removed in the final state of Eγ,τ , then the corresponding node is removed in Eγˆ , and vice
versa.
Therefore the final extents will be the same, correcting for removed helper nodes (set H):
Eγˆ(
∣∣∣R̂2n rH∣∣∣) = Eγ,τ (|Rn|) .
Observe that when this reduction step is applied to E and E, if for some edge e, τ+(e) ≥ τ(e) then in the
reduced epidemics γˆ− ≤ γˆ in the corresponding helper nodes. This satisfies the hypotheses of the theorem
and the restrictions of Step 1 (γ−(v) ≤ γ(v) for all v ∈ V ).
Step 3: Reduction of σ and σ+ to a single node α
Any pair E and E where there is more than one initial infectee can be mapped to a pair of the same respective
extents but where only one node is initially infected, as follows.
Take an epidemic Eσ,γ,τ that starts at time t = 0 from an initial set formed with probabilities σ on graph
(V,A) and spreads with transmission probabilities τ and removal probabilities γ. Couple it to an epidemic
Eα that starts at time t = −1 at a single node α in a slightly larger graph (V ′, A′):
1. Let V ′ = V ∪ {α} and I−1 = {α}
2. Let α never be removed before infecting neighbors: γ(α) = 0
3. For all v ∈ V add an edge (α, v) : A′ = A ∪ {(α, v) for all v ∈ V }
4. The probability of transmission is τ(u, v) =
{
τ(u, v) (u, v) ∈ A
σ(v) u = α
.
The constructed epidemic originates at α, and at time t = 0 the set I0 has the same distribution as in the
original epidemic. The mean extent of Eα is just one node larger (node α) than the mean extent of Eσ,γ,τ .
This implies that a situation where σ+ ≥ σ can be mapped to a problem covered by Step 2, where both E
and E originate at α, because a larger σ is equivalent to greater probability of transmission τ+ for edges
from α to q satisfying σ+(q) > σ(q). This completes the theorem. An immediate consequence of Steps 2
and 3, and Lemma 1 is that every node is at least as likely to become infected under E as under E.
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